But if the militias did fight, what might be expected to happen? Cornwallis' army would deploy in a line and run, or rather stumble, through a half-mile gauntlet in the forest, severely impeded, harassed, and deranged by trees and undergrowth and by frontal fire from the two lines of militia. And killing, enfilade fires would come from the corps of riflemen on both flanks, who were instructed to keep even with the British progress all the way back to the Continental line. There, the redcoats might be sufficiently exhausted and reduced in numbers, that Greene's regulars could destroy them by close-in fire and bayonets in a general melee.
It was a good plan, in keeping with the Quaker General's subtle approach to warfare. It offered reasonable guarantees against disaster, some chance of winning, and even better chances of doing severe damage to the British with his expendable militias and escaping with his regulars intact.. But it was only a plan. And marching up the road was the completely unsubtle Lord Charles Cornwallis with an army of veteran killers. The only plan he knew or cared to know was straight-up-the-middle, all-out fighting; victory or perish. He arrived in front of Greene's carefully positioned North Carolina militia early in the afternoon of March 15th, 1781:
The advanced British units emerge from the woods to find a line of militia, in two lines. The first line is behind a log fence, the second behind a line of trees. Beyond the militia, are the battle tested Maryland and Delaware troops, and Washington and Lee's dragoons on the flanks. Greene had entertained an action similar to Morgan's at the battle of Cowpens, but distance is far greater here, and it would be impossible to coordinate the troops. Furthermore, Greene has no reserve element to throw into the fray.
Cornwallis is at an equal disadvantage. He does not know Greene's strength, or his deployment of the troops.