A half-mile east of the Lawson’s brigade, near Guilford Courthouse and wholly on the north side of the road, Greene posted his line of 1500 Continental foot soldiers, one brigade from Virginia on the north or right flank, and another from Maryland, running southways on an arc bowed toward the west and reaching the road somewhat west of Guilford Courthouse. A series of open fields sloped down and away from the Continental front, westward into a narrow cleared valley. It was the best defensive position on the battlefield, offering high ground, forest cover to the immediate rear, and open fields of fire in front. Also, and by no means coincidentally, lying a few score yards to the rear of the Continental line and protected by it, was the army’s escape road. This led north from the courthouse to Speedwell Furnace on Troublesome Creek, halfway to the Dan crossings into Virginia.
There was a battery of four English- cast, six-pounder brass cannons, called ‘butterflies’, from the Virginia Regiment of Artillery. These were posted at the center of the North Carolina line and would fall back along the road as events proved necessary.
Finally, Greene had two somewhat misnamed ‘corps of observation’ for use in the harassment of Cornwallis’ flanks and the protection of his own. They numbered around 500 each. The one on the north consisted of William Washington’s regular Virginia cavalry, Robert Kirkwood’s company of Delaware continentals, and Colonel Charles Lynch’s 360 riflemen from Bedford County, Virginia. And there was a similar unit composed of the Virginia Legion of Light Horse Harry Lee, a regiment of cavalry with a company of Continental infantry, plus 350-400 riflemen under Colonel William Campbell, most of them from western Virginia counties and the rest from North Carolina. After their mid-morning fight at New Garden Meeting House, they were now formed in a west trending, wooded ravine which marked the southern limit of the cleared fields lying before the North Carolinians’ front line.
What did Greene hope to accomplish by these dispositions, and how closely did they conform to Dan Morgan’s letter of advice to him on how to fight Cornwallis? Two thirds of his best Virginia riflemen were placed on the flanks under their own ‘enterprising officers’ as Morgan had recommended. And, like Morgan at the Cowpens, Greene had posted his musket militias in the center and in front of his Continental line, with orders to get in a few good rounds and then withdraw. But Morgan had also warned him that the militias might not fight at all, in which case: …[Cornwallis] will beat you and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces , which will be losing all our hopes. And it is this thought which seems to have dominated his battle plan at Guilford.
Greene’s post was with his regulars a half mile through the woods to the rear of his militias. He could not control, support, or even observe them. But he was guarding and practically on his planned route of retreat, and no matter what the militias did or didn’t do, he could save his regulars by going back to Virginia. He might get beat but he was not going to preside over a disaster.
